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Abstract
The experiences of social partners are important motivators of social action. Can infants use such experiences to make
predictions about how social agents will behave? Sixteen-month-old infants were introduced to two social pairs. Initial events
established within-pair cooperation as well as between-pair conflict involving an individual from each pair. Following these
events, infants looked longer when between-pair members who had never previously interacted now cooperated – instead of
conflicted – with each other. Thus, infants tracked the third-person allegiances and inferred that the conflict would generalize
across social partnerships. These findings demonstrate a critical feature of early social cognition and promote needed, further
research on the role of social allegiances in social cognition across development.
Introduction
Human action is often motivated by the experiences of
social partners. Imagine that two children – Jane and
Molly – have an argument. Another child, Jill, sees the
conflict, and later initiates an argument with Molly. This
incident can be understood – and even predicted – if we
(1) know that Jill is friends with Jane (or otherwise has a
cooperative allegiance with her, e.g. perhaps they have
previously helped one another, or are on the same sports
team), (2) expect social partners to be influenced by each
other’s experiences, and thus (3) infer that given Jane’s
conflict with Molly, Jill will be unfriendly towards Molly
too. Tracking social allegiances and monitoring the
experiences of social partners are crucial strategies for
explaining and predicting behavior. Indeed, behavioral
patterns consistent with this example – in which social
partners act on each other’s behalf – are plentiful in
experimental social psychology research (Batson, 1998),
and in observational (e.g. of patterns of schoolyard
bullying; Hodges, Boivin, Vitaro & Bukowski, 1999; of
aggression in non-human primates; Cheney & Seyfarth,
1986, 1999) and sociological studies (e.g. the spreading of
violence across urban gangs; Papachristos, 2009). Adult
psychologists as well as laypersons (Batson, 1998)
regularly form expectations about others’ behavior by
monitoring social allegiances.
Do human infants use the experiences of social
partners to form expectations about how agents will
behave? That is, do infants track social allegiances? This
is a surprisingly neglected question. By the second year
of life, infants appeal to a range of unobservable causal
factors when forming expectations about human action,
including goals (Woodward, 1998), desires (Repacholi &
Gopnik, 1997) and beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005).
By focusing on the role of individual mental states,
however, this research has not examined whether infants
use broader aspects of social structure (e.g. social
partnerships, group memberships) to understand and
predict behavior.
This represents an important theoretical gap. Under-
standing whether infants incorporate social allegiances
into their expectations about behavior is necessary to
establish both the origins of social cognition and the
nature of developmental change. One possibility is that
recognition of the inferential value of social partnerships
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stems from children’s own experiences with social
partners (similar to the example above). By the preschool
years, children use social partnerships to predict certain
emotional states (Pietraszewski & German, 2013) and
behaviors (Chalik & Rhodes, 2014). For example, 4-year-
olds expect people to become angry with those who
harm their friends (Pietraszewski & German, 2013) and
expect group members to retaliate on each other’s behalf
following conflict among individuals from different
groups (Chalik & Rhodes, 2014). Because infants in
the second year of life have yet to form their own stable
friendships or cooperative partnerships outside of the
family (Platten, Hernik, Fonagy & Fearon, 2010),
however, understanding coalitions and alliances could
be a later developing component of social cognition,
developing only post-infancy. Alternatively, monitoring
the experiences of social partners and using such
experiences to predict behavior could contribute to, as
well as result from, early childhood social interactions,
and therefore be evident even in infancy. If so, this would
reveal an important continuity in social cognition across
development.
A few studies indicate that infants have some system-
atic expectations about patterns of social interaction. For
example, securely attached 12-month-old infants expect
maternal-like agents to approach and provide help to –
rather than abandon – baby-like agents (Johnson, Dweck
& Chen, 2007). Ten-month-olds expect individuals to
approach agents who have helped them in the past over
agents who have harmed them (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom,
2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn & Bloom, 2003), and 9-month-
olds expect people who have similar food preferences to
interact positively but those with dissimilar preferences
to interact negatively (Liberman, Kinzler & Woodward,
2014). By 18 months, toddlers expect someone to pro-
vide help to a friend who is in distress (Beier, Carpenter
& Tomasello, 2011). Yet, none of these previous studies
have tested whether infants make inferences about the
behavior of agents based on the experiences of the
agents’ social partners. Here, instead of asking whether
infants expect individuals to come into conflict with
those whom they have fought with in the past (along the
lines of prior work), we test whether infants expect
individuals to come into conflict with those whom their
social partners have fought with in the past. The present
research thus examines broader understandings and
potentially more powerful social expectations than have
been documented in prior infant work. The present
studies test whether infants use the experiences of social
partners to form expectations about how third parties
will behave, and specifically whether infants expect
conflict (rather than cooperation) between two agents
based on the interactions of other related parties.
Study 1a
Method
Participants included 33 infants1 (17 male; M age =
15.92 months, range = 15.53–16.47 months) randomly
assigned to the Conflict condition (N = 16) or the
Cooperation condition (N = 17). Eight additional
infants were excluded for fussiness (n = 4), parent
interference (n = 2), computer problems (n = 1), and
low interest in the initial events (n = 1).
The stimuli were a series of videoed events. Infants’
looking times were coded by a live observer. A secondary
observer coded 33% of participants. Observer agreement
was within 1 second or less on 88.3% of trials in Study 1a
(92% for Study 1b; 85% for Study 1c; 90% for Study 2a;
83% for Study 2b; 93% for Study 3a; 82% for Study 3b).
The setting included a cloth-covered table, with a
transparent box in the middle containing a clearly visible
multicolored ball (see Figure 1). The events involved
four characters: an orange cat (Cat-A), a grey cat (Cat-
B), a multicolored dog (Dog-A), and a black dog (Dog-
B). The pair of cats wore red bandanas and the pair of
dogs wore white bandanas. The events were shown in
three phases in a violation-of-expectation paradigm. The
first two phases introduced and established the partner-
ships by displaying several interactions, and the last
Figure 1 Photograph of display, Study 1.
1Our target sample size for all studies was n = 24. Because we expect
that some infants who are scheduled to participate will not provide
usable data (e.g. because they miss their appointment or do not
complete the experiment), we schedule more participants in advance to
ensure an adequate sample size. Sometimes, this leads to a larger
sample size than intended, as well as to variability in the sample size
across studies. Here, we report all collected data; however, analyses on
all data sets using only the first 24 participants yield identical patterns
of significant results.
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phase tested expected interactions about two agents who
had never previously interacted but whose partners had.
Phase 1: Introduction
Phase 1 involved three introductory events: (1) the pair of
dogs entered from the back of the stage, approached the
box, looked at it with interest and then left through the
back, (2) the pairof cats entered from the backof the stage,
approached the box, looked at it with interest and then left
through the back, and (3)Dog-A entered through the back
of the stage and sat in the back right corner of the table,
Cat-A entered through the back of the stage and sat in the
back left corner of the table (see Figure 1).
Phase 2: Establishing relationships
The second phase presented the relevant social partner-
ships and interactions. To help infants track the social
partnerships, multiple cues were provided: species (one
partnership included two dogs, the other two cats), a
visual feature (one partnership wore white bandanas, the
other wore red) and social behaviors (the members of
each partnership helped each other obtain a goal).
Crucially, the events were designed to show that the two
dogs were cooperative social partners and the two cats
were cooperative social partners. The events also pre-
sented an instance of conflict between one member of
each partnership. The events used to establish coopera-
tion and conflict built on methods used by Hamlin and
Wynn (2011).
As schematized in Figure 2, at the beginning of each
event, Dog-A sat in the back right corner of the stage
and Cat-A sat in the back left corner of the stage. Then,
either Dog-B or Cat-B (referred to as the target agent)
entered from the back of the stage, approached the box,
and attempted – but failed – to open it three times. Next,
one of the two animals already sitting on the table
approached the box, and a series of four events occurred,
two cooperation events and two conflict events. In a
cooperation event, the approaching animal helped the
target agent to open the box, took out the toy, and those
two animals played with it cooperatively by passing the
ball back and forth while the ball made a jingling noise.
In a conflict event, the approaching animal prevented the
agent from getting the toy by slamming the box shut,
then took the ball out himself, and that animal plus the
target agent fought over it by pulling it back and forth.
Growling sounds (synchronized to the jingling sounds in
a cooperation event) were made as the animals pulled the
ball back and forth. The pulling (in conflict events) and
the passing back and forth (in cooperation events) were
also synchronized so that in both displays the animals
moved in tandem in a similar manner back and forth on
the screen.
There were four events presented in the set order
shown in Figure 2. Thus, the first two events estab-
lished the cooperative pairings, and the second two
events established incidents of conflict between one
member from each pair. Note that, although Cat-A
and Dog-A were present on the stage throughout
Phase 2, they never interacted with each other.
Critically, all four animals engaged in two action
sequences each, once in a cooperative sequence and
once in a conflict sequence.
Phase 3: Test events
Test events began as did Phase 2 events – Cat-A and
Dog-A sat alone in the back corners on the stage. This
time, however, one of them acted as the target agent, by
approaching the box (from the corner), and attempting
(but failing) to open it three times. As schematized at the
bottom of Figure 2, the other animal on the stage then
approached, and initiated either the cooperation or the
conflict actions (the same actions as in Phase 2). Each
infant saw one type of test event (conflict or cooperation)
two times. Test trials ended when infants looked away for
2 continuous seconds or after 60 seconds. Within each
condition, approximately half of the infants saw Dog-A
as the target agent and half saw Cat-A as the target
agent. Thus, the test events differed from Phase 2 in that
the target agent was Dog-A or Cat-A (instead of Dog-B
or Cat-B) and Dog-A and Cat-A, who had never
interacted previously, now interacted.
Results and discussion
Phase 2 events were presented for a maximum of
33 seconds each. Infants looked equally long at cooper-
ation events (events 1 and 2, M = 30.37, SD = 2.58) and
conflict events (events 3 and 4, M = 29.28, SD = 3.69), tFigure 2 Schematic of events, Study 1.
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(32) = 1.67, ns. Thus, infants were highly interested in
both types of events and did not receive more exposure
to one type or the other.
If infants have tracked the relevant social partnerships,
expect the experiences of an agent’s social partners to
influence the agent’s behavior, and so expect members
from different pairs to conflict with each other following
conflict between their partners, then infants who see an
instance of cross-pair cooperation should look longer at
the scene (indicating increased interest and violation of
expectation) than infants who see an instance of cross-
pair conflict. Indeed, infants looked significantly longer
in the Cooperation condition (M = 54.99, SD = 7.06)
than in the Conflict condition (M = 44.70, SD = 11.81), t
(31) = 3.06, p = .005, d = 1.06, see Figure 3. Thus, even
though infants had never before seen the agents involved
in the test trials interact with each other, they found an
instance of cross-pair cooperation attention-worthy
(unexpected), following an instance of conflict involving
those agents’ social partners.
Study 1b
We propose that infants looked longer at the cooperation
than conflict test events in Study 1a because of their
preceding exposure to the cooperative partnerships.
However, perhaps infants just have telling expectations
about these specific test events regardless of any prior
experimental information. For example, maybe infants,
even at this young age, expect that dogs and cats are more
likely to fight than cooperate, or that any two animals,
generally, are more likely to fight than cooperate. To
address this possibility, we examinedwhether infants look
longer at our cooperation than conflict test events in the
absence of previous exposure to Phase 2 events.
In Study 1b, a new sample of 24 infants (13 male; M
age = 15.85 months, range = 15.53–16.40) were shown
the identical test events used in Study 1a, but without
any previous exposure to Phase 2 events. Again half saw
the conflict test events and half the cooperation (lower
part of Figure 2). Unlike in Study 1a, looking time to the
test events did not vary by condition (Conflict,
M = 42.60, SD = 11.98, Cooperation, M = 46.12, SD =
14.67), t(22) = .83, ns. Thus, infants did not look longer
at the cooperation than conflict test events of Study 1a
because they generally found cooperation more unex-
pected than competition, or cooperation between dogs
and cats more interesting or unexpected than conflict
between dogs and cats.
Study 1c
Studies 1a andb leaveopen thequestion ofwhether infants
are responding to relations between types of animals (e.g.
dogs vs. cats) as opposed to actions between individuated
agents who also happen to fall into different social
partnerships. We address this issue further in Studies 2
and 3, but in advance and at a minimum we needed to
establish whether infants discriminate between the differ-
ent individual animals. To obtain this evidence, a new
group of 26 infants first saw one pair of animals (i.e. the
two cats or twodogs) complete the events shown inPhase 1
of Study 1a (i.e. the pair of animals entered, walked up to
the box, and looked at it). Subsequently, they saw scenes
where initially only the box was on the stage and one
individual (e.g. Cat-A) entered the stage from the back,
approached the box and tried to open it three times. Then,
the scene froze. Infants saw this scene five times allwith the
same animal (e.g. Cat-A), and then saw the exact same
sequence performed by another animal. For half the
infants (N = 13, 5 male; M age = 15.74 months, range =
15.50–16.40) these events involved same-species animals
(either two cats, n = 6; or two dogs, n = 7). For half the
infants (N = 13, 6 male; M age = 15.84, range = 15.53–
16.40) these events involved a cat and a dog.
As expected, infants’ looking time significantly
increased when the identity of the agent changed, both
when identities changed within a species (e.g. Cat-A to
Cat-B; t(12) = 3.23, p = .007, d = .97, last trial before
character change, M = 9.88, SD = 6.65; first trial of new
character, M = 17.10, SD = 8.11; 11 of 13 infants
increased their looking across the key trials, p = .022,
binomial test) and following the change in species (t(13)
= 3.22, p = .007, d = 1.25, last trial before character
change,M = 9.20, SD = 6.93; first trial of new character,
M = 22.34, SD = 14.44; 11 of 13 infants increased their
looking across the key trials, p = .022, binomial test).
Figure 3 Looking time in seconds to test events, Studies 1a,
2a, 3a. Error bars represent one standard error of the means.
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These data show that infants of this age are capable of
discriminating between these individual animals; in
Studies 2 and 3 we provide further evidence that they
did so in the context of the more complicated Phase 2
and Phase 3 events of our main experiments.
Study 2
Study 1a presented several cues to the relevant social
partnerships: species (dogs vs. cats), social behavior
(within-pair cooperation), and perceptual cues (ban-
dana color). Study 1b confirmed that infants do not
generally expect that animals of different species, or
animals marked by different bandana colors, will come
into conflict instead of cooperate, but rather formed
these expectations because of the previous instances of
within-pair cooperation and cross-pair conflict. What
types of cues are necessary for infants to track social
partnerships in this manner? Of particular importance
is whether social interactions alone can define the
partnerships for infants or whether infants track social
partnerships only when they are consistent with
previous category knowledge (e.g. that dogs differ
from cats). Study 2a addresses these possibilities.
Study 2a
Study 2a was identical to Study 1a, with the exception
that all of the agents were dogs. To help children track
the individual identities and partnerships, each dog
had unique coloring and features and one pair of dogs
wore red bandanas and the other wore white.
Methods
Participants were 30 infants (11 male; M age =
15.92 months, range = 15.50–16.37); an additional 2
infants were excluded for fussiness (n = 1) or low interest
in the initial events (n = 1). Procedures were identical to
Study 1, except that infants first completed a warm-up to
help them individuate the four different dogs. Infants
were shown all four puppets and were allowed to hold
each one, one at a time. To introduce each dog, the
experimenter said, for example, ‘Look at this doggy. It’s
got a red scarf.’ In this warm-up, the dogs never
interacted. After this, infants were shown the same Phase
1, Phase 2, and test events described in Study 1.
Results
Infants looked equally long at the cooperation Phase 2
events (M = 29.88, SD = 2.60) as the conflict Phase 2
events (M = 29.57, SD = 2.51), t(29) = .60, ns. Thus,
infants received extensive and equal exposure to both
types of events.
Replicating Study 1a, infants looked longer at the test
events in the Cooperation condition (M = 47.65, SD =
11.11) than in the Conflict condition (M = 38.15, SD =
11.32), t(28) = 2.32, p = .03, d = .85; see Figure 3. Thus,
infants tracked social partnerships even when they did
not reflect previous category knowledge. Besides this
substantive finding, infants’ discriminative responding to
the test events of Study 2a indicates that they must be
differentiating the individual dogs, because otherwise all
the agents in Study 2a would be interchangeable.
Study 2b
Study 2b addressed whether infants expected the mem-
bers of the different pairs to come into conflict instead of
cooperate because of the Phase 2 events that established
the cooperative allegiances, rather than general expecta-
tions about how these individual dogs or dogs wearing
different colors will interact. Participants were 24 infants
(13 Male, M age = 15.9 months, range = 15.53–16.37).
Following the same warm-up used in Study 2a, children
were shown either the conflict or cooperation test events,
with no prior Phase 2 events, as in Study 1b. As expected,
infants looked equivalently long at the conflict
(M = 32.43, SD = 11.32) and cooperation (M = 31.11,
SD = 11.56) test events, t(22) = 0.28, ns. Thus, infants did
not look longer in the cooperation than conflict test
conditions of Study 2a because they generally found
cooperation more interesting or unexpected.
These data also confirm that infants in Study 2a did
not form expectations about cross-pair cooperation or
conflict simply because of the perceptual differences
between the groups (i.e. the different bandana colors),
but rather because of the social interactions presented
in the Phase 2 events. Thus, although the perceptual
feature that marked the pairs (bandana color) may (or
may not) have been helpful for allowing infants to
track the relevant social partnerships in Study 2a, this
perceptual feature alone was not sufficient to set up
the key partnership expectations documented there. In
Study 2b, bandana color did not lead infants to
expect cooperation or conflict; infants formed
those expectations only in Study 2a where bandana
color was accompanied by information about social
interactions.
Together, Studies 1a and 2a confirm that infants form
expectations about social behavior based on information
about within-pair and cross-pair interactions. Even when
the agents were individual members of the same species
(rather than from distinctively different species), infants
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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monitored partnerships based on the agents’ social
interactions.
The data across both studies also rule out further
alternative interpretations. For example, suppose infants
behaved according to a rule such as ‘having seen conflict
between dogs and cats, expect conflict for other dogs and
cats’ in Study 1a. Such an approach could not yield the
Study 2a findings, because infants had seen both conflict
and cooperation among dogs. In general, Studies 1b and
2b confirm that infants are not merely relying on general
expectations about categories (dogs vs. cats) or percep-
tual markers (bandana color).
Study 3
In Study 2a, infants tracked social allegiances when
partnerships were marked by both bandana color and
cooperative interactions. Study 2b ruled out the possi-
bility that infants used bandana color alone to form
expectations about how members of different pairs
would interact with one another. Nevertheless, an
important issue remains: perhaps after viewing the Phase
2 events, infants simply inferred that animals with
different colored bandanas would conflict with one
another. In other words, perhaps they focused so much
on the bandana colors that they simply encoded ‘one
red-wearing dog and one white-wearing dog conflicted’
and thus expected a red-wearing dog and white-wearing
dog to conflict again, without noticing that the individ-
ual identities of the involved parties changed from the
Phase 2 to Phase 3 events. To address this issue, we
conducted Studies 3a and 3b.
Study 3a
Methods
Participants were 24 infants (10 male; M age =
15.86 months, range = 15.50–16.33); an additional four
infants were tested but excluded (1 for fussiness, 3 for low
interest in the Phase 2 events). Procedures were identical
to Study 2a, with three exceptions. First, during the
initial warm-up, in which children were allowed to hold
each dog (see Study 2a), the dogs began wearing
bandanas but the experimenter then removed the ban-
danas, giving the infant exposure to the dogs without
them. As in the previous studies, each dog had individual
markings that we expected infants would be able to use
to individuate the dogs and track the cooperative
partnerships. Second, although the dogs wore bandanas
in Phase 1 and Phase 2 (to help infants track the crucial
interactions) the dogs wore no bandanas for the critical
Phase 3 test events. Thus, if infants merely formed the
expectation that animals with different bandanas would
conflict, or failed to encode the individual identities of
the agents, then during the test trials they should have no
systematic expectations about how particular agents will
behave. Third, pilot testing revealed that many infants
looked longer at the test events in this study than in the
previous two studies, perhaps because it took them
longer to identify the relevant social partnerships during
the test trials in the absence of a perceptual aid.
Therefore, we increased the maximum looking time
allowed during the test events from 60 seconds to
90 seconds.
Results
As in previous studies, infants looked equally at the
Cooperation (M = 31.52, SD = 1.51) and Conflict
(M = 30.65, SD = 1.93) events during Phase 2, t(23) =
1.89, ns. Replicating Studies 1a and 2a, infants looked
longer at the test events in the Cooperation condition
(M = 65.73, SD = 18.78) than in the Conflict condition
(M = 47.93, SD = 18.31), t(22) = 2.34, p = .03, Cohen’s
d = .96; see Figure 3. Thus, infants tracked social
partnerships (perhaps initially aided by bandanas) and
applied that partnership information even in the absence
of bandana color. In this procedure, infants formed
systematic expectations about how the members of the
different pairs would interact with each other, even when
the individual members of the pairs were no longer
marked by bandana colors. Thus, these data further
confirm that infants tracked the individual dogs’ iden-
tities, otherwise they would not have been able to track
the social partnerships during the Phase 3 events.
Study 3b
Study 3b was designed to confirm that infants in Study
3a looked longer at the cooperation than conflict events
because of the preceding Phase 2 events that established
the cooperative allegiances. Participants were 25 infants
(11 male; M age = 15.9 months, range = 15.6–
16.4 months). Following the same warm-up as used in
Study 3a, children were shown either the conflict or
cooperation test events, with no prior Phase 2 events, as
in Studies 1b and 2b. Procedures for these test events
(including the maximum allowable looking time) were
identical to Study 3a. As expected, infants looked
equivalently long at the conflict (M = 46.90, SD =
13.87) and cooperation (M = 51.76, SD = 18.57) test
events, t(23) = .75, ns. Thus, infants did not look longer
in the cooperation than conflict test conditions of Study
3a because they generally found cooperation more
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unexpected. Together Studies 3a and 3b confirm that
infants can track social allegiances, and use social
partnerships to form expectations about behavior based
on social interactions alone, even in the absence of
salient perceptual cues.
General discussion
We demonstrated that monitoring the experiences of
social partners and using those experiences to form
expectations about individual action are functional
components of early social cognition. In these viola-
tion-of-expectation studies, infants looked longer when
an agent cooperated with a target when that agent had
previously come into conflict with the target’s social
partner. They looked longer at these instances of cross-
pair cooperation only when they had seen a previous
instance of cross-pair conflict. They did so when the
target agents had never interacted previously (Studies 1a,
2a, and 3a) and when nothing differentiated the agents
except their individual identities and the patterns of prior
interaction of their partners (Study 3a). The critical
pattern of results in Studies 1a, 2a, and 3a was obtained
even though infants did not find either the cooperation
or conflict sequence intrinsically more interesting (as
shown in Studies 1b, 2b, and 3b), and when infants’
general category knowledge (species differences, Study
1a) and perceptual cues (bandana color, Study 2a) both
could and could not (Study 3a) facilitate their expecta-
tions on the test trials.
These studies go beyond previous work in infant
social cognition, which has focused predominantly on
the prediction of action by appeal to individual mental
states (Johnson, 2000). This work also goes beyond
previous studies of infants’ expectations of social
interactions (Kuhlmeier et al., 2003; Johnson et al.,
2007; Liberman et al., 2014) by showing that infants
expect social interactions to shape the subsequent
behavior of previously uninvolved social partners. In
showing that infants track social allegiances, we
establish a critical feature of early social cognition
and open a new line of research on the role of social
partnerships in social cognition across development
(see also Beier et al., 2011; Pietraszewski & Wynn,
2011). For example, future work could examine the
inference processes underlying infants’ expectations.
There are two separate inference processes that could
lead infants to look longer at cross-pair cooperation
(following an instance of cross-pair conflict): (1)
infants may infer that initial cross-pair conflict will
cause later conflict among the social partners, or (2)
infants may infer that the initial cross-pair conflict
simply provides evidence of ongoing, underlying
conflict between the pairs.
Several other critical questions remain regarding the
processes that underlie the effects documented here. For
example, perhaps infants’ behavior in the present
studies reflects general expectations that members of
pairs interact with each other in characteristic ways that
differ from members of other pairs. Such general
expectations would enable infants to make a wide range
of inferences about behavior (e.g. pair members tend to
play one kind of game with each other but not with
members of other pairs, or pair members give one kind
of greeting to each other but another kind to members
of other pairs). On this account, the present findings
would reflect general group-oriented mechanisms not
specific to reasoning about cooperation or conflict.
Alternatively, infants’ expectations could be more
specific to tracking inter-group cooperation and conflict
(e.g. Cosmides, Tooby & Kurzban, 2003), or events with
positive or negative valence (Premack & Premack,
1997), or for reasoning about helping and harming
(Hamlin, 2013). That is, from our data, it is not yet
clear how general or specific the mechanisms are that
infants use to guide their social partner expectations
and inferences. Another critical issue for future work is
to determine the extent to which infants interpret the
conflict and cooperation interactions presented here as
indicative of stable social relationships (such as friend-
ships) that hold predictive power across time and in
new situations.
Preschool-age children show some selectivity in their
inferences about how agents are influenced by interac-
tions involving their social partners. For example,
preschool-age children expect emotional states (e.g.
anger) but not physical states (e.g. dizziness) to gener-
alize across social partners (Pietraszewski & German,
2013). Preschool-age children also expect conflict to
generalize across groups (e.g. they expect a fight between
individuals from different groups to lead other members
of the groups to fight with each other) more than mildly
positive behaviors would (e.g. they do not expect sharing
between individuals from different groups to lead group
partners to share with each other; Chalik & Rhodes,
2014; Rhodes, 2012). Whether infants’ expectations are
similarly restricted to certain types of behaviors – or
whether such generalizations and specificities develop
across the first few years of life – is an important issue
for future work.
Perhaps the most intriguing questions concern the
developmental origins of and developmental changes in
social cognition. The present findings, along with the
recent work among preschool-age children described
above (Pietraszewski & German, 2013; Chalik &
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Rhodes, 2014), suggest some continuity across early
human development for this component of social cog-
nition. Yet research in other areas of social cognition has
documented important changes from infancy through
childhood, as children incorporate early implicit biases
into more explicit, articulated theories of human action
(Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). Thus, in future work
it will be useful to employ similar methods with both
younger infants and older children, to identify the full
developmental course of this component of social
cognition. The present findings also suggest the possi-
bility of an important continuity between this aspect of
social cognition in humans with social cognition in non-
human primates (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1986, 1999). Such
possibilities, and possible future research, become war-
ranted and intriguing based on our demonstration that
human infants expect agents’ partnerships to shape and
predict those agents’ actions and interactions.
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